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By ARAD te 1~-01~-'JI. 
PROSPECTS FOR 
COMMUNIST CHINA 
To estimate the prospects for Communist China over the 
next several years with emphasis on the viability of the 
regime and trends in its foreign policy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The future course of even ts in Communist China will 
be shaped largely by three highly unpredictable variables: 
the wisdom and realism of the leadership, the level of agri-
cultural output, and the nature and extent of foreign eco-
nomic relations. During the past few years all three vari-
ables have worked against China. In 1958 the leadership 
adopted a series of ill-conceived and extremist economic and 
social programs; in 1959 there occurred the first of three 
years of bad crop weather; and in 1960 Soviet economic and 
technical cooperation was largely suspended. The combina-
tion of these three factors has brought economic chaos to 
the country. Malnutrition is widespread, foreign trade is 
down, and industrial production and development have 
dropped sharply. No quick recovery from the regime's eco-
nomic troubles is in sight. (Paras. 5-14) 
2. Economic disasters have brought widespread disillusion-
ment and disaffection in their wake, but we believe that wide-
spread organized resistance to the regime is unlikely to de-
velop. In any case, the regime's monoply on arms, organi-
zation, and communications is probably sufficient to crush 
any incipient uprising. Communist China's armed forces 
have experienced setbacks in their modernization program 
and logistical capabilities, but, although there has been some 
decline in morale, they will probably remain loyal to the 
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regime. We believe that by the end of the decade the Chinese 
Communists will have a limited nuclear weapons and missile 
capability.1 (Paras. 21-24) 
3. We believe that over the next few years Communist 
China will follow relatively conservative and rational policies 
of the kind recently instituted, that the odds favor improved 
crop weather, and that increased trade with Western Europe 
and Japan will partially compensate for the severe reduction 
in Soviet economic and technical cooperation. We therefore 
believe that the most likely prospect is for slow recovery and 
a gradual resumption of economic growth. However, there 
is also a possibility that the economic depression will continue, 
bringing increasing problems for the regime, and there is 
a slimmer possibility of fairly rapid recovery and economic 
expansion. In any case, over the longer run, given com-
munism's demonstrated inefficiency in agriculture, it is possi-
ble that the regime will founder on a failure to solve China's 
chronic food problem. (Paras. 15-20) 
4. We believe that the US will continue to face a hostile 
Communist China which will be constantly probing for weak-
nesses, trying to push the US out of the Western Pacific, and 
causing trouble wherever else it can. Meanwhile China will 
probably continue to promote the image of being a strong but 
peaceful nation, while covertly providing tactical guidance 
and material aid, to the extent of its capabilities, to leftist 
revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
Outside the Far East these capabilities are limited by China's 
poverty, relative international isolation, and difficulties with 
the USSR. Communist China almost certainly does not 
intend to attempt the open military conquest of any Far 
Eastern country during the period of this estimate, although 
it would almost certainly be willing to take military action 
to defend Communist interests in North Vietnam and North 
Korea and, probably in Laos. (Paras. 26- 35) 
1 See NIE 13- 2- 62, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities," 
dated 25 April 1962. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelli-
gence), Department of the Navy, believes that a reliable estimate of the 
Chinese Communist program in the development of nuclear weapons can-
not yet be made. His footnote to paragraph 38 of NIE 13- 2- 62 contains 





5. Communist China contains the greatest 
mass of people ever ruled by a single govern-
ment. It has a limited amount or arable 
land and plentiful but underdeveloped natural 
resources. When the Communists took power 
in 1949 they set out to mold this raw material 
into a leading modern state in a single gen-
eration. For the first 10 years, it seemed as 
if they might achieve this aim; the whole na-
tion was placed firmly under the control of 
Peiping, industrial output was multiplied, a 
powerful military machine was established, 
and education and science were developing 
rapidly. 
6. In 1958 the Chinese Communists ap-
peared confident that within two decades they 
would be one of the dominant powers of the 
world. They accelerated the tempo of eco-
nomic development by launching the "great 
leap forward," believing that, with their vast 
population, effective organization, great en-
ergy, supposedly infallible leadership, and So-
viet support, success was assured. Western-
ers returned from China profoundly im-
pressed with the industrial progress and the 
almost frightening dynamism and fanaticism 
they had observed. By the end of 1961, how-
ever, the picture was strikingly different. Ag-
gricultural output had dropped, factories had 
closed, education and scientific development 
had been disrupted, severe rationing had been 
instituted and many millions of people were 
suffering from serious malnutrition. The re-
sultant change in the mood and outlook of 
the Chinese people and their leaders has been 
startling. Travelers, especially those who 
had seen the country in 1958 or before, were 
amazed at the widespread lethargy and sul-
lenness; confidence was gone, morale was low, 
petty corruption had become relatively com-
mon, and disillusionment with the regime was 
expressed openly. Obviously the regime has 
lost much ground, some of which it may never 
recover. 
7. Peiping's almost complete silence on eco-
nomic results for 1960 and 1961 and on the 
plans for 1961 and 1962 obscures the causes 
and extent of this reversal. It is clear that 
overambitious plans obstinately persisted in 
by Peiping's leaders disrupted economic plan-
ning and production, overworked plant and 
equipment, and demoralized the people. Also, 
in mid-1960, the exhaustion of grain and other 
reserves, a balance of payments crisis, and 
the sudden withdrawal of most Soviet tech-
nicians seriously disrupted its industrial pro-
gram. Moreover, adverse weather, ill-con-
ceived programs, and faulty management re-
sulted in three successive years (1959-1961) 
of poor harvests. 
8. In 1961 there was probably less output 
from China's farms than there was in the 
"normal" year 1957, yet population had in-
creased by around 60 million. The result has 
been widespread hunger and malnutrition. 
The improved transportation facilities and 
the more effective control which the regime 
had developed over the past decade or so have 
made it possible to spread the suffering so 
that, although all (except a favored few) are 
underfed, there has been no localized mass 
starvation of the sort traditional in China. 
9. Industrial production began to fall 
sharply in the latter part of 1960 and has re-
mained low since. Raw material shortages 
affected some sectors, chiefly cotton textiles, 
where ration data suggest a halving of output 
as a result of the poor 1960 cottton crop. 
Also, the halt in expansion eliminated the 
market for some products, e.g., freight car 
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production was reduced 80 percent from 1960 
to 1961. Peiping ordered the concentration 
of output in plants meeting cost and quality 
standards, more reasonable rates of operation, 
and increased maintenance efforts. Western 
diplomats and travelers inside China have 
reported that the majority of factories they 
have seen in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, 
and a few other accessible cities, appear to be 
either closed or opera ting at a small part of 
capacity. Even the armed forces appear to 
have had to absorb a full share of production 
cutbacks. We have good evidence only for 
the first half of 1961, but during that period 
the military received only a small percentage 
of scheduled deliveries of construction mate-
rials and maintenance parts. 
10. We believe that the gross national prod-
uct (GNP) decreased by more than 10 per-
cent in 1961-the first decrease since the Com-
munists came to power. Foreign trade for 
1961 fell about 25 percent (around $1 billion) 
from the 1959 high, and with the initiation 
of large grain imports, capital goods imports 
were sharply reduced. Foreign exchange re-
serves were badly depleted. 
11. The people of China, who had been 
urged and pushed into prodigious efforts and 
sacrifices by the promise of wondrous progress 
under the three-year "leap forward," now find 
then1selves worse off than they were before. 
They are understandably bitter and disillu-
sioned with the Communist leadership. In 
the countryside, pilfering of crops, clothing, 
and ration coupons, and even highway rob-
bery have been reported. In many cities beg-
ging, blackmarketing, theft, and prostitution 
are once again evident. Open grumbling has 
become more commonplace and anti-Commu-
nist slogans have appeared on walls. Yet 
there have been no large uprisings (except 
for the sustained rebellion of the isolated 
Tibetan minority), and the regime has quickly 
crushed such small local disturbances as have 
arisen. 
12. The external relations of the regime 
have also given Peiping little cause for cheer 
in recent years. For example, China's trade 
embargo failed in its objective to influence 
Japanese policy. Despite improved relations 
with Burma and Nepal, the continued border 
dispute with India has drastically reduced 
Peiping's influence in India and is an em-
barrassment for Peiping in its relations with 
the rest of the world. The resounding vote 
against Communist China's admission to the 
UN in 1961 was probably a surprise and a 
disappointment. Peiping's severe domestic 
difficulties have done much to weaken the 
carefully cultivated image of Chinese com-
munism as the model for other underdevel-
oped countries. Most importantly, the dis-
pute with Moscow, which had been tem-
porarily papered over by the December 1960 
Moscow communique, intensified in the latter 
part of 1961.2 
13. The Chinese Communist leaders were 
apparently stunned by this accumulation of 
setbacks. The annual meeting of the Na-
tional People's Congress was cancelled in 1961 
and the Ninth Communist Party Congress 
which was due by 1961 was not called. Stren-
uous debates have evidently taken place 
within the upper echelons of the party con-
cerning the best means to regain rapid prog-
ress. There are those who urge conservative, 
go-slow policies and concessions to the people 
and those who believe that the present need 
is for more and better political indoctrination 
and tighter regime discipline. In any case 
the two years 1961 and 1962 have been set 
aside as years of rehabilitation and reorgan-
ization. Peiping has retreated markedly, in 
practice, from such grandiose programs as the 
"leap forward" and the giant communes. 
However, there appears to be no unanimity as 
to the best policy to extricate China from its 
2 Sino-Soviet relations are discussed in NIE 11-5-62. 
"Political Developments in the USSR and the Com-
munist World," dated 21 February 1962. 
4 SECReT-
-SEC~Ef 
present great depression; policies adopted in 
the past year or so are cautious and tentative 
and lack countrywide uniformity. 
II. PROSPECTS 
14. Whether Communist China can regain 
its forward momentum depends upon three 
fundamental, but uncertain, considerat ions: 
the wisdom and realism of the leadership, the 
nature and extent of foreign economic rela-
tions, and the level of agricultural production. 
During the past few years all of these factors 
have worked to China's disadvantage. 
15. If these three factors continue to de-
velop adversely for Communist China, the re-
sults could be extremely grave for the popu-
lation as a whole and, indeed, for the regime 
itself. The lowering of an already inadequate 
level of food supplies, a failure of the regime 
to provide a realistic development program, 
and the hamstringing of industrial growth 
because of insufficient foreign economic sup-
port would create a deepening pessimism and 
an increasingly brittle political situation. In 
this circumstance the regime might be 
changed by a "palace coup" or it might re-
main in power ruling over a miserable, weak-
ened country through privileged military and 
security forces. In the latter situation, the 
regime might eventually be overthrown with 
the aid of defecting military forces or China 
might be split by contending military factions . 
16. If, on the other hand, these three basic 
variables develop in a manner favorable to the 
regime-that is, if the regime's policies are 
realistically conceived and intelligently im-
plemented, if there is several years succession 
of better than average crop weather and har-
vests, and if Soviet or Western technicians, 
machinery, and credits become available in 
volume-China would probably recover rapidly 
from its current depression. Industrial pro-
duction would again rise, aided by greater 
supplies of agricultural raw materials and a 
more productive labor force. To a consider-
able extent the regime would regain its lost 
dynamism. However, even under the best of 
conditions, China, with its basic problem of 
limited land and expanding population, will 
walk a thin line between economic sufficiency 
and economic shortage. 
17. The manner in which the three variables 
are likely to develop cannot be estin1ated with 
much confidence. The regime appears to be 
aware of the gross planning and management 
errors of the recent past and is likely to adopt 
a more realistic program in the future. 
China's weather, as it affects agriculture, 
tends to be erratic, but it is unlikely that the 
cxtrcn1ely bad we2ther of the past three years 
will persist over the period of this estimate. 
On the other hand, we believe it unlikely that 
Soviet economic and technical cooperation 
will return to past high levels or that Peiping 
can fully meet its needs from the West or in-
ternal sources. Thus, it appears to us that 
Communist China will probably avoid com-
plete economic failure and political collapse, 
and that it will recover gradually from its 
present severe depression. However, even if 
agricultural production is increased substan-
tially, China will almost certainly not ap-
proach in the next few years the dramatic 
rate of economic growth achieved during the 
first decade of Communist rule. 
18. Domestic Prospects. The close race be-
tween China's population growth and food 
production will probably continue to over-
shadow all other problems facing the regime. 
Until recently Peiping has tended to neglect 
agriculture while concentrating on the de-
velopment of heavy industry in the traditional 
Communist pattern. Public pronouncements 
of the regime, including the statements from 
the recent National Peoples Congress, indicate 
a tern porary reversal in economic priori ties; 
the restoration and expansion of agricultural 
production is to have precedence. The ex-
pansion of heavy industry is practically sus-
pended for the time being, and production 
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in those segments of industry serving agri-
culture is apparently being maintained and 
expanded to the extent that the present eco-
nomic situation permits. Concessions have 
been made to peasant individualism and 
methods have been adopted which attempt to 
relate the peasant's income directly to his 
achievement. 
19. If the regime's policies continue along 
these lines for the period of the estimate, 
there is a chance for a fairly rapid increase 
in agricultural output. Assuming no worse 
than average weather over the next several 
years, farm output will probably increase suffi-
ciently to keep ahead of population growth 
and permit some improvement in the diet. In 
the longer run, mainland China must seek 
much greater yields per acre. The regime 
will probably seek to do this through collec-
tive institutions both because of its ideologi-
cal bias and its need to hold down consump-
tion. The narrow margin between food pro-
duction and the minimum needs of a weak-
ened and apathetic population gives the re-
gime little room for error in top-level agricul-
tural policy. Thus, we can foresee no in-
creases in agricultural output in the next 
several years sufficient to provide a real solu-
tion to the regime's chronic food problem. 
20. Over the next few years industrial 
growth will probably be inhibited. It will 
probably be necessary to continue grain im-
ports and restrict farm exports for the next 
year or two, and this together with accumu-
lated trade deficits will reduce the amount of 
foreign exchange available for the import of 
capital goods for industry. Agricultural 
materials for light industry will continue to 
be in short supply, and inadequate diet will 
continue to limit the vigor and enthusiasm 
of the workers. On the other hand, Commu-
nist China has an impressive long-term poten-
tial for industrial growth. China has an 
abundance of natural resources necessary for 
industrial development, a considerable indus-
trial capacity built up since 1952, a labor 
force of unequalled size with an increasing 
number of skilled workers and technicians, 
and a growing managerial class. In addition 
Peiping has begun to broaden its trade rela-
tions with the West in order to open up new 
sources of capital equipment. Finally, the 
country is ruled by a strong regime which is 
determined to make China a modern indus-
trial power. On balance we believe that over 
the next few years, Communist China's in-
dustrial output will make appreciable gains 
from present low levels. At first this will re-
sult mainly from merely returning presently 
idle plant capacity to production. In addi-
tion, there will be a gradually increasing 
amount of new plant construction. However, 
the goal of "overtaking England" by 1970, 
much advertised a few years ago, is not even 
a dream today. 
21. If the regime can get the country mov-
ing forward again, it will probably regain a 
measure of popular support. This will be far 
short of what it enjoyed from 1949 to 1958. It 
will no longer be able to count on a high degree 
of revolutionary, almost frenetic enthusiasm. 
It will face a continuing problem of finding 
sufficient consumer goods to provide worker 
incentives and minimize discontent. In the 
short run, while reconstruction is getting 
underway, the present high level of resent-
ment against the regime could intensify, 
especially if the food supply is not improved 
and further sacrifices are demanded from the 
population generally. Even in this case, we 
do not believe there would be a serious internal 
threat to the regime. On the one hand, the 
Chinese people have demonstrated an almost 
unlimited ability to bear suffering with pa-
tience and resignation, and malnutrition ap-
pears to have inspired apathy and lethargy 
rather than violence. On the other hand, the 
state, with its monopoly on arms, organiza-
tion, and communications will probably be 
able easily to isolate and mop up any local 
pockets of resistance that might develop. 
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22. Political stability in China rests less on 
popular support than on the unity of the 
ruling group and the efficacy of th~ ?om-
m unist Party as an instrument of administra-
tion. The top leadership still presents a per-
suasive appearance of overall stability and 
unity, although we assume there h~ve bee? 
divergencies of viewpoint. We believe this 
unity will be maintained essentially intact ur:-
less there is a marked worsening of economic 
conditions or an impetuous shift away from 
the present policy of moderation and recover.y. 
However, Mao and most of his colleagues in 
the highest echelons will be increa~ingly .v:il-
nerable to the physical and mental infirmities 
of old age, and it would be rash to discount 
entirely the possibility of a top-level shake up 
resulting from the death or retirement of one 
or more of the top leaders. 
23. Should divisions or factions appear in 
the top leadership there might well be a break-
down in the party's effective control over the 
country. Numbering over 17 million mem-
bers, 80 percent of whom joined after the 
Communist seizure of power, the party has 
continuing problems of organization and dis-
cipline. Rectification campaigns have re-
sulted in a high rate of political expulsions 
since 1959; approximately one million mem-
bers were dropped from party rolls. Many 
cadres are already confused and dispirited by 
the failure of the "leap forward" and would 
be profoundly disoriented by a breakdown of 
unity at the top. 
24. Communist China's armed forces ex-
perienced setbacks in their modernization pro-
gram and logistical capabilities as a conse-
quence of material shortages. Moreover there 
has been some decline in morale. N everthe-
less Communist China continues to have by 
far the strongest indigenous armed forces 
in the Far East. During the next two or 
three years there is likely to be little improve-
ment in their capabilities, but before the pres-
ent decade has ended they will probably have 
acquired some capability in nuclear weapons 
and missiles. 3 
25. This capability will be restricted by the 
weakness of China's economic base and tech-
nological industries. The well-conceived b:1t 
unrealistically scheduled 12-year program m 
science and technology, launched in 1956, 
made impressive progress, but any prospects 
for reaching its goals have been wiped out by 
the excesses of the "great leap forward" and 
the drastic cut in Sino-Soviet technical co-
operation. As a result, scientific and techni-
cal progress over the next few years will be 
generally slow and erratic. Five years from 
now, in spite of impressive advances, Co~mu­
nist Chinese science and technology will be 
further behind that of the most advanced 
countries than it is now. Around that time, 
however new sci en tis ts and technicians will be 
graduatfng in greater numbers and China's 
relative position as a scientific power should 
begin to improve. Its potential is great. 
26. Outlook for Communist China's Foreign 
Policy. Communist China's leaders must be 
aware of the weakness of China's present 
situation, but they appear to be confident that 
their policy is in line with the forces of the 
future and that China's difficulties and rela-
tive isolation are only temporary. They be-
lieve that anti-imperialism will dominate the 
international scene for some years to come, 
and they plan to capitalize on this movement, 
and as far as possible, guide and control it. 
According to their reasoning a continuing 
and spreading revolutionary movement in the 
underdeveloped areas will sap and eventually 
destroy the strength of the "Western imperial-
ists." The Chinese leaders are apparently 
• See NIE 13- 2- 62, "Chinese Communist Advanced 
Weapons Capabilities," dated 25 April 1962. The 
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), 
Department of the Navy, believes that a reliable 
estimate of the Chinese Communist program in the 
development of nuclear weapons cannot yet be 
made. His footnote to paragraph 38 of NIE 13-2-62 
contains the rationale for his position. 
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convinced that the Soviets will in time be 
forced to return to the Leninist "truths" and 
provide more militant leadership to the world 
Communist movement in supporting and ac-
celerating this historic development. It is 
Peiping's faith in its ideological vision and 
in China's future greatness that leads it to 
remain unyielding in the pursuit of the main 
lines of its foreign policy: implacable anti-
Americanism and a two-level campaign to 
spread Communist influence. 
27. Peiping's two-level campaign consists 
of overt seduction and covert subversion. 
Overtly the regime poses as a peaceful giant 
who helps its friends but strikes back power-
fully at those who conspire against it. Ex-
cept for some brief lapses which occurred 
mainly during the manic "leap forward" pe-
riod, Peiping has consistently maintained this 
pose. It has given aid to "neutralist" regimes 
in Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia, and it 
has vociferously voiced its pursuit of peace, 
the Bandung spirit, and various schemes for 
an "atom-free" Pacific. Peiping insists that 
its armed forces are strictly defensive and will 
never be used to communize a foreign terri-
tory (thus their slogan: "communism can-
not be exported"). This does not, in their 
logic, preclude the overt use of military forces 
to "complete the unification of China" (i.e., 
conquer Taiwan) or to aid a friend who is be-
ing "ravished by imperialist invaders" (e.g., 
Korea in 1950 and, potentially, North Viet-
nam). Communist China almost certainly 
does not intend to attempt the open military 
conquest of any other Far Eastern country 
during the period of this estimate. However, 
it would almost certainly be willing to take 
military action to defend Communist inter-
ests in North Vietnam and North Korea and, 
probably, in Laos. 
28. In the long pull Peiping apparently 
places its chief hopes upon action on the sub-
versive level. The Communist Chinese lead-
ers believe that much of the underdeveloped 
world is ripe for revolution, that anticolonial-
ist revolts should be encouraged and aided 
wherever possible, and that Communists 
should guide and take over these revolutions 
whenever practicable. According to Peiping, 
Moscow greatly overrates the danger that such 
local wars might escalate into World War III, 
and Peiping holds that Soviet talk of dis-
armament and the horrors of nuclear war tend 
to weaken the militancy of "the people." 
29. The Chinese leaders must be frustrated 
by their extremely limited capability to im-
plement their policy of subversion and the 
encouragement of revolution in areas outside 
the Far East because of their own poverty, 
relative international isolation, and their 
difficulties with the Soviet Union. However, 
they do what they can. For exarnple, Peiping 
has trained natives for subversive activities 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and it 
n~cognized and overtly supported the Algerian 
rebel regime long before the USSR was ready 
to take such steps. In the Far East Peiping's 
capabilities for subversive action are increased 
by the accessibility and vulnerability of neigh-
boring countries. 4 For the foreseeable future 
Peiping will almost certainly continue these 
policies to the limit of its capabilities. 
30. The anti-American aspect of Peiping's 
foreign policy is deeply grounded. The Chi-
nese leaders see in the US the epitome of all 
that is evil in the "bourgeois capitalist sys-
tem." On the purely practical level they 
recognize that US strength and determination 
is the chief obstacle to the seizure of Taiwan 
and the realization of their plans to achieve 
hegemony in East and Southeast Asia. Pei-
ping also uses the US bogey to rally the people 
behind the Communist regime. Thus every 
unpopular occurrence in the world, including 
France's Sahara A-bomb tests and the ex-
cesses of the OAS in Algeria, is blamed on 
1 See NIE 13-3-61, "Chinese Communist Capabili-




Washington. Wherever Peiping can strike at 
the US it does-supporting anti-Eisenhower 
riots in Japan, wooing the disgruntled textile 
exporters in Hong Kong, supporting anti-US 
action in South Vietnam and Laos. 
31. We do not believe that this policy will 
significantly change under the present lea?er-
ship regardless of what policies the US might 
adopt. This does not preclude temporary 
gestures of reasonableness by Peiping for tac .. 
tical purposes. 
32. There are signs of a third and espe-
cially ominous motif in Communist China's 
foreign policy. This is racism. Alth?ugh 
Peiping has not promoted the race issue 
openly or officially, racism occasionally filters 
through in their propaganda. We do not be-
lieve racism will become a major Chinese Com-
munist theme during the next few years, but 
it may grow with time partly as a means of 
capitalizing on the antiwhite resentment of 
the Africans. 
33. Athough the essential guidelines are 
likely to remain fixed, within that framework 
lesser changes and gradual shifts in Commu-
nist China's foreign policy appear to be almost 
inevitable. During the next few years the 
tendency toward lessening dependence upon 
the Bloc will almost certainly lead Peiping to 
turn increasingly to Western Europe and 
Japan for technology and equipment as it has 
already turned to Canada and Australia for 
food. This could also bring with it increased 
political and cultural contacts. An increased 
reliance on trade with the West would almost 
certainly disincline the Chinese from moving 
toward a direct confrontation with the West-
ern Powers but it would not change their ' . fundamental aims nor would it prevent Pei-
ping from bitterly attacking the po~icies of i~s 
free world trading partners should it find this 
suits its political interests. Peiping probably 
estimates that unless its policy directly and 
physically conflicts with that of Wester~ cour:-
tries, the latter are unlikely to permit their 
trade relations to be seriously affected by 
political differences. 
34. Although Hong Kong and Taiwan come 
within Peiping's definition of Chinese terri-
tory and are therefore proper object.s for the 
use of military force we do not believe that 
an attempt will be made upon either during 
the next few years. The offshore islands will 
probably be subjected to harassment, but we 
do not believe that Peiping will feel strong 
enough to accept the risks entailed in an at-
tempt to seize them. We believe that a seizu~e 
of Macao is also unlikely but less so than m 
the case of Hong Kong. 
35. Peiping will continue to support the ex-
treme leftists in Japan, but it will be prepared 
to adopt a more friendly attitude toward the 
government if it senses a possibility of recog-
nition or some other means of complicating 
US-Japanese relations. Peiping apparently 
desires to improve relations with India but 
it will be very difficult to resolve the border 
differences. In Southeast Asia Peiping will 
probably try to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the US but its interests are too closely 
identified with North Vietnam and the Com-
munist position in Laos for it to be able to 
tolerate serious reverses in these areas. 
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